Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a new primitive called identity-based encryption with wildcards, or WIBE for short. It allows a sender to encrypt messages to a whole range of receivers whose identities match a certain pattern. This pattern is defined through a sequence of fixed strings and wildcards, where any string can take the place of a wildcard in a matching identity. Our primitive can be applied to provide an intuitive way to send encrypted email to groups of users in a corporate hierarchy. We propose a full security notion and give efficient implementations meeting this notion under different pairing-related assumptions, both in the random oracle model and in the standard model.
Introduction
The concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir as early as in 1984 [25] , and the same paper proposed an identity-based signature scheme. However, it took nearly 20 years for an efficient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to be proposed. In 2000 and 2001, respectively, Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [24] and Boneh and Franklin [8] proposed IBE schemes based on elliptic curve pairings. Also, in 2001 Cocks proposed a system based on the quadratic residuosity problem [13] .
One of the main application areas proposed for IBE is that of email encryption. In this scenario, given an email address, one can encrypt a message to the owner of the email address without needing to obtain an authentic copy of the owner's public key first. In order to decrypt the email, the recipient must authenticate itself to a trusted authority who generates a private key corresponding to the email address used to encrypt the message.
Identity-Based Encryption with Wildcards
Our work is motivated by the fact that many email addresses correspond to groups of users rather than single individuals. Consider the scenario where there is some kind of organisational hierarchy. Take as an example an organisation called ECRYPT which is divided into virtual labs, say AZTEC and STVL. In addition, these virtual labs are further subdivided into working groups WG1, WG2 and WG3. Finally, each working group may consist of many individual members. There are several extensions of the IBE primitive to such a hierarchical setting (HIBE) [16, 18] . The idea is that each level can issue keys to users on the level below. For example, the owner of the ECRYPT key can issue decryption keys for ECRYPT.AZTEC and ECRYPT.STVL.
Suppose that we wish to send an email to all the members of the AZTEC.WG1 working group, which includes the personal addresses -ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.Nigel, -ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.Dario, -ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.John.
Given a standard HIBE, one would have to encrypt the message to each user individually. To address this limitation, we introduce the concept of identity-based encryption with wildcards (WIBE). The way in which decryption keys are issued is exactly as in a standard HIBE scheme; what differs is encryption. Our primitive allows the encrypter to replace any component of the recipient identity with a wildcard so that any identity matching the pattern can decrypt. Denoting wildcards by *, in the example above the encrypter would use the identity -ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.* to encrypt to all members of the AZTEC.WG1 group.
It is often suggested that identity strings should be appended with the date so as to add timeliness to the message, and so try to mitigate the problems associated with key revocation. Using our technique we can now encrypt to a group of users, with a particular date, by encrypting to an identity of the form -ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1.*.22Oct2006 for example. Thus any individual in the group -ECRYPT.AZTEC.WG1 with a decryption key for 22nd October 2006 will be able to decrypt.
As another example, take a hierarchy of email addresses at academic institutions of the form -name@department.university.edu, i.e. the email address of John Smith working at the computer science department of Some State University would be johnsmith@cs.ssu.edu. Using our primitive, one can send encrypted email to everyone in the computer science department at Some State University by encrypting to identity *@cs.ssu.edu, to everyone at SSU by encrypting to *@*.ssu.edu, to all computer scientists at any institution by encrypting to *@cs.*.edu, or to all system administrators in the university by encrypting to sysadmin@*.ssu.edu.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the primitive of identity-based encryption with wildcards, or a WIBE for short. We define appropriate security notions under chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attack, and present the first instantiations of this primitive. In more detail, we present the syntax and security notions in Sect. 3. To illustrate the relationship between WIBEs and other identity-based primitives, we show how WIBE schemes can be built from HIBE schemes and from fuzzy identity-based encryption schemes.
As is the case for most public-key and identity-based encryption schemes, the nonhybrid WIBE schemes can only be used to encrypt relatively short messages, typically about 160 bits. To encrypt longer messages, one will have to resort to hybrid techniques: the sender uses the WIBE to encrypt a fresh symmetric key K and encrypts the actual message under the key K. The basic construction has been used within the cryptographic community for years, dating back to the work of Blum and Goldwasser in 1984 [6] , but its security for the case of public-key encryption was not properly analysed until the work of Cramer and Shoup [14] . One would intuitively expect these results to extend to the case of WIBEs, which is indeed the case. We present the syntax for a WIB-KEM in Sect. 4, along with the composition theorem which proves that the combination of a secure WIB-KEM and a secure DEM results in a secure WIBE scheme.
We also give several constructions for a WIBE scheme, classified according to their security guarantees. We first present the Boneh-Boyen WIBE (BB-WIBE-see Sect. 5.1) and the Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE (BBG-WIBE-see Sect. 5.2). These schemes are IND-CPA secure in the selective identity model and do not require random oracles to be proven secure, although we do require random oracles in order to prove their security in the full (non-selective-identity) model (see Sect. 5.4) . We also present the Waters WIBE scheme (see Sect. 5.3) which is secure in the non-selective-identity IND-CPA setting without random oracles.
The range of IND-CPA WIBE schemes available makes selection difficult. The Waters WIBE scheme has the best security guarantees, but the worst performance. In particular, the number of elements in the master public key depends upon the maximum length of an identity, which is typically of the order of 160 bits. Hence, even with a small number of levels, the size of the master public key can be prohibitive. Both the BB-WIBE scheme and the BBG-WIBE scheme have better performance characteristics, but their security (in the non-selective-identity model) depends on random oracles. Furthermore, the BBG-WIBE scheme reduces to the less-studied L-BDHI assumption, but has the best performance characteristics.
The construction of IND-CCA secure WIBE schemes is more difficult. We present two generic transformations from an IND-CPA scheme into an IND-CCA scheme. The first transformation is based on the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform (see Sect. 6.1) which builds an L-level IND-WID-CCA secure WIBE from an (L + 1)-level IND-WID-CPA WIBE. The disadvantage of our construction compared to the original CHK transform is that our construction always encrypts messages under patterns of length L + 1. This often increases the space and time complexity of the scheme in practical situations (as the worst performance characteristic are often obtained for "full-length" patterns). The approach we present in this paper is different from the approach given in the ePrint version of [1] , which requires using 2L + 2 levels as opposed to L + 1. We thank the anonymous referee for helping guide us to this improvement.
Our second transform is based on Dent's construction of a KEM (see Sect. 6.2). This converts a weakly secure (one-way) WIBE scheme into an IND-CCA secure WIB-KEM, but requires the random oracle model in order to prove its security. We note that one-way security is implied by IND-CPA security (for sufficiently large messages spaces). Consequently, we can use any of the IND-CPA constructions given in Sect. 5 to build an IND-CCA secure scheme.
In [5] , we also presented a WIB-KEM in the standard model based on the KiltzGalindo HIB-KEM from [20] . Due to our improved CPA to CCA transform described above, this is no longer as efficient as the transformed Waters WIBE, hence we do not consider the Kiltz-Galindo WIB-KEM in this paper.
An overview of all the schemes we present is given in Table 1 and Table 2 .
A Recap on Various Primitives
In this section, we recall basic notation and known results on different primitives that we will be using throughout this paper. In particular, we will recall several constructions of We compare the schemes in terms of number of elements in the master public key (|mpk|), number of elements in the user secret key (|d|), number of elements in the ciphertext (|C|), number of exponentiations required for key encapsulation (Encap), number of pairings required for key decapsulation (Decap), and the dominant factor lost in the security reduction to the underlying assumption. L is the maximal hierarchy depth and n is the bit length of an identity string. The values q H and q K refer to the number of queries made by an adversary to the random oracle and key derivation oracle, respectively.
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption schemes (HIBEs) upon which out Wildcarded Identity-Based Encryption schemes (WIBEs) are based.
Basic Notation
Let N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} be the set of natural numbers. Let ε be the empty string. If n ∈ N, then {0, 1} n denotes the set of n-bit strings and {0, 1} * is the set of all finite bit strings.
If s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is an ordered sequence of n elements of some set and 0 ≤ ≤ n, then s ≤ is the ordered sequence consisting of the first elements of s, i.e. s ≤ = (s 1 , . . . , s ). Furthermore, if ID is an n-bit string, then we set
If S is a finite set, then y $ ← S denotes the assignment to y of a randomly chosen element of the set S. If A is a deterministic algorithm, then y ← A(x) denotes the assignment to y of the output A when run on the input x. If A is a randomised algorithm, then y $ ← A(x) denotes the assignment to y of the output of A on the input x when the algorithm is run with fresh random coins.
Hash Functions
A hash function is a family of maps F k : IP → OP index by a keyspace K in which the output space OP is finite. The input space IP may be finite or infinite. Additionally, the key space may be empty or non-empty. There are many security properties that can be ascribed to a hash function. We will only need to consider one security property at this time (although we will introduce further security notions in later sections and may model these hash functions as random oracles).
Definition 1. A (t, )-adversary
A against the second pre-image resistance property of a family of hash functions F k : IP → OP with a finite input space IP is an algorithm that runs in time at most t and has advantage at least , where the adversary's advantage is defined to be:
One-Time Signature Schemes
In order to amplify the security of a HIBE/WIBE (from IND-CPA security to IND-CCA security), we will make use of a one-time signature scheme. A one-time signature scheme is a triple of algorithms (SigGen, Sign, Verify). The key generation algorithm SigGen outputs signing and verification keys (sk, vk) for the signature scheme. The signing algorithm takes as input a signing key sk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs a signature σ ∈ {0, 1} * . The verification algorithm takes as input a verification key vk, a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and a signature σ ∈ {0, 1} * , and outputs either (indicating a valid signature) or ⊥ (indicating an invalid signature). For correctness, we require that for all key pairs (sk, vk), messages m ∈ {0, 1} * , and signatures σ $ ← Sign(sk, m), we have that Verify(vk, m, σ ) = with probability one.
The security notion for a one-time unforgeable signature scheme is captured by the following game played between an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a hypothetical challenger: A (t, ) -adversary against the one-time unforgeability of the signature scheme is an algorithm that runs in time t and has advantage at least in winning the above game.
Bilinear Maps and Related Assumptions
Let G, G T be multiplicative groups of prime order p with an admissible mapê : G × G → G T . By admissible we mean that the map is bilinear, non-degenerate and efficiently computable. Bilinearity means that for all a, b ∈ Z p and all g ∈ G we havê e(g a , g b ) =ê(g, g) ab . By non-degenerate we mean thatê(g, g) = 1 if and only if g = 1.
In such a setting, we can define a number of computational problems. The first we shall be interested in is called the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem [19] : given a tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , T ), the problem is to decide whether T =ê(g, g) abc or whether it is a random element of G T . More formally, we define the following game between an adversary A and a challenger. The challenger first chooses a random generator g 
where the probabilities are over the random choice of g, a, b, c, T and over the random coins of A.
Definition 3. A (t, )-adversary
A against the BDDH problem is an algorithm that runs in time at most t and has advantage at least .
We note that throughout this paper we will assume that the time t of an adversary includes its code size, in order to exclude trivial "lookup" adversaries.
A second problem we will use in our constructions is the -bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion ( -BDHI) problem [7, 21] . The problem is to computeê(g, g) 1/α for random
. . , g (α ) . The decisional variant of this problem is to distinguishê(g, g) 1/α from a random element of G T . We say that adversary A has advantage in solving the decisional -BDHI problem if
where the probability is over the random choice of g We note that the BDDH problem is a weaker assumption than the -BDHI assumption. Hence, all other things being equal schemes which are based on the BDDH assumption are to be preferred to ones based on the -BDHI assumption. However, our most efficient constructions are based on the -BDHI assumption as opposed to the BDDH assumption. As the two assumptions are very different in nature, it is hard to compare precisely various schemes; indeed, the comparison would depend on the readers view with respect to the interpretation of exact security results and the view of the relative hardness of the two underlying problems.
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) providing the following functionality. The trusted authority runs Setup to generate a master key pair (mpk, msk). It publishes the master public key mpk and keeps the master secret key msk private. When a user with identity ID wishes to become part of the system, the trusted authority generates a decryption key d ID $ ← KeyDer(msk, ID), and sends this key over a secure and authenticated channel to the user. To send an encrypted message m to the user with identity ID, the sender computes the ciphertext C $ ← Encrypt(mpk, ID, m), which can be decrypted by the user as m ← Decrypt(d ID , C). We refer to [8] for details on the security definitions for IBE schemes.
In this paper, we are more interested in the concept of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) [16, 18] . In a HIBE scheme, users are organised in a tree of depth L, with the root being the master trusted authority. The identity of a user at level 0 ≤ ≤ L in the tree is given by a vector Definition 5. A (t, q K , )-adversary against the IND-HID-CPA security of a HIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most t, makes at most q K queries to the key derivation oracle, and has advantage at least in winning the IND-HID-CPA game described above.
The IND-HID-CCA security game is identical to the IND-HID-CPA security game with the exception that in the IND-HID-CCA security game the adversary additionally has access to a decryption oracle that, on input of a ciphertext C and an identity ID, returns the decryption m ← Decrypt(KeyDer(msk, ID), C). The adversary wins the game if β = β , it never queries the key derivation oracle with any ancestor identity of ID * , and it never queries the decryption oracle with the pair (C * , ID * ) after the challenge ciphertext is computed. In a selective-identity (sID) attack [7] , the adversary has to output the challenge identity ID * at the very beginning of the game, before even seeing the master public key. In other words, the adversary is considered to be a triple (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ), where A 0 simply outputs the challenge identity (and some state information to be passed to A 1 ). The definitions for IND-HID-CPA and IND-HID-CCA security are otherwise identical to those above. In the random oracle model [2] , all algorithms, as well as the adversary, have access to a random oracle mapping arbitrary bit strings onto a range that possibly depends on the master public key. All above security definitions then take an extra parameter q H denoting the adversary's maximum number of queries to the random oracle.
We now recap on the main efficient HIBE constructions in the literature, namely the HIBE schemes of Waters (W-HIBE), Boneh-Boyen (BB-HIBE), and Boneh-BoyenGoh (BBG-HIBE).
The Boneh-Boyen HIBE
In this section, we present a variant of the HIBE scheme by Boneh and Boyen [7] . In this scheme, we assume that identities are vectors of elements of Z p -if necessary this can be achieved by applying a collision-resistant hash function h : {0, 1} * → Z p to binary identities before applying the scheme. The scheme is described in Fig. 1 . The Algorithm Setup:
Return
Return m main difference between the original HIBE scheme of [7] and our variant above is that our scheme uses a different value u i,1 for each level, while the original scheme uses the same value u 1 for all levels. Adding wildcard functionality to the original scheme would require us to include u r 1 in the ciphertext, but this ruins security as it can be used to change the identity for which a ciphertext is encrypted.
For completeness, we prove the security of this new HIBE scheme, despite its similarities to scheme of Boneh and Boyen [7] .
Theorem 1. If there exists a (t, q K , )-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BB-HIBE (with hierarchy depth L) then there exists a (t , )-adversary against the BDDH problem in G, where ≥ − q K /p and t ≤ t + O(L · q K · t exp ) and t exp is the maximum time for an exponentiation in G and p is the order of G.
Proof. The present proof follows very closely the proof of security for the original scheme in [7] . As before, we assume that there exist an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ) that breaks the IND-sID-CPA-security of the BB-HIBE scheme and then we show how to efficiently build another adversary B that, using A as a subroutine, manages to solve the BDDH problem in G.
Algorithm B first receives as input a random tuple (g, A = g a , B = g b , C = g c , Z) and its goal is to determine whether Z =ê(g, g) abc orê(g, g) z for a random element z in Z p . Algorithm B should output 1 if Z =ê(g, g) abc and 0 otherwise. Algorithm B works as follows.
Initialisation. Algorithm B starts by running algorithm A 0 , which responds with the challenge identity
Setup. To generate the systems parameters, B first sets for all i, we have that
As a result, when Z =ê(g, g) abc =ê(h 1 , g 2 ) c , C * is a valid encryption of message m β for the challenge identity ID * = (ID * 1 , . . . , ID * * ). On the other hand, when Z = e(g, g) z for a random value z $ ← Z p , then the challenge ciphertext is independent of β from the view point of the adversary. Phase 2. B runs A 2 on the challenge ciphertext C * . If A 2 makes any key derivation oracle queries, then they are answered as in Phase 1. A 2 terminates and outputs a bit β . Output. If β = β then B outputs 1, guessing that Z =ê(g, g) abc , otherwise B outputs 1.
Suppose E does not occur. Clearly, when Z =ê(g, g) abc , the view of A is identical to its view in a real attack and, thus, the probability that b = b is exactly the probability that A wins the IND-sHID-CPA game. On the other hand, when Z is a random group element in G T , then the probability that b = b is exactly 1/2. Hence, if E does not occur then A wins with probability . If E does occur, then the simulator fails; however, for E to occur then A must submit a key extraction query for an identity ID where ID * Algorithm Setup:
Return m is a prefix of ID and ID is a prefix ofĨ D * . This implies that ID * +1 = ID * * +1 but, since ID * * +1 is chosen at random and hidden from the execution of the attacker A, we have that Pr [ E ] ≤ q K /p. From the above, the result announced in Theorem 1 follows immediately.
The Boneh-Boyen-Goh Scheme
In this section, we present the HIBE scheme due to Boneh, Boyen and Goh [10] , referred to as the BBG-HIBE scheme here. Again, we assume that identities are vectors of elements of Z p . The scheme is described in Fig. 2 .
The following theorem about the security of the scheme was proved in (the full version of) [10] .
Theorem 2. If there exists a (t, q K , )-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BBG-HIBE (with hierarchy depth L) then there exists a (t , )-adversary against the L-BDHI problem in G, where ≥ and t
and t exp is the time for an exponentiation in G.
The Waters Scheme
Waters [27] argued that his IBE scheme can easily be modified into an L-level HIBE scheme as per [7] . Here we explicitly present this construction, that we refer to as the Waters-HIBE scheme. The scheme makes use of n-bit identities and is described in Fig. 3 . The scheme makes use of group elements (u 1,0 , . . . , u L,n ) which are available as part of the scheme's public parameters. These group elements define a series of hash Algorithm Setup:
Return m 
where
Waters [27] informally states that the above HIBE scheme is IND-HID-CPA secure under the BDDH assumption, in the sense that if there exists a (t, q K , )-adversary against the HIBE, then there exists an algorithm solving the BDDH problem with ad-
. We shall assume in what follows that the Waters HIBE scheme is indeed IND-HID-CPA secure. However, the reader should be aware that any security results we state for schemes derived from the Water HIBE scheme are conjectural relative to the above assumption.
Hierarchical Identity-Based Key Encapsulation
One efficient paradigm for producing HIBE schemes is to the hybrid KEM-DEM construction. In the public key setting, this was first formally investigated by Cramer and Shoup [14] and extended to the identity-based setting by Bentahar et al. [3] . A hybrid construction consists of an asymmetric KEM and a symmetric DEM.
A hierarchical identity-based KEM (HIB-KEM) consists of four algorithms (Setup, KeyDer, Encap, Decap). The setup algorithm Setup and key derivation algorithm KeyDer have the same syntax as for a HIBE scheme. The encapsulation algorithm Encap takes as input a master public key mpk and an identity ID = (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) with 0 ≤ ≤ L; it outputs a symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1} λ and an encapsulation C. The decapsulation algorithm Decap takes as input a private key d ID and an encapsulation C, and outputs either a symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1} λ or the error symbol ⊥.
The security models for a HIB-KEM is similar to those of a HIBE scheme. The IND-HID-CCA game for a HIB-KEM, played between an attacker A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger, is defined as follows: The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle and decryption oracle as before. The adversary outputs a bit β .
The adversary wins the game if β = β , it never queries the key derivation oracle with any ancestor identity of ID * , and if it does not query the decryption oracle on the pair (ID * , C * ) after it receives the challenge ciphertext. As usual, the adversary's advantage is defined to be equal to |2 · Pr [ A wins ] − 1|.
Definition 7. A (t, q K , q D , )
-adversary against the IND-HID-CCA security of the HIB-KEM is an algorithm that runs in time at most t, makes at most q K queries to the key derivation oracle, makes at most q D queries to the decryption oracle, and has advantage at least in winning the IND-HID-CCA game described above.
Again, if the random oracle model [2] is used in the analysis of a scheme, then the above security definitions take an extra parameter q H as input. This parameter denotes the adversary's maximum number of queries to the random oracle.
A DEM is a pair of deterministic algorithms (Enc, Dec). The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1} λ and a message m of arbitrary length, and outputs a ciphertext C ← Dec(K, C). The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1} λ and a ciphertext C, and returns either a message m or the error symbol ⊥. The DEM must satisfy the following soundness property: for all K ∈ {0, 1} λ and for all m ∈ {0, 1} * , we have that
The only security model which will concern us for DEMs is the (one-time) IND-CCA security game, which is played between an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger: 
Definition 8. A (t, q D , )-adversary against the (one-time)
IND-CCA security of the DEM is an algorithm that runs in time at most t, makes at most q D decryption oracle queries, and has advantage at least in winning the IND-CCA game described above.
A HIB-KEM and a DEM can be "glued" together to form a complete HIBE scheme. Further details can be found in [3] .
The Canetti-Halevi-Katz Transform
We shall, in one of our constructions of a CCA WIBE scheme, make use of the techniques behind the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [11] . To aid the reader we recap on this here. This is a transform to turn a weakly secure (IND-sID-CPA) IBE scheme into a fully secure (IND-CCA) public key encryption scheme. We let (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) denote the key-generation, extraction, encryption, and decryption algorithms of the IBE scheme, and (Setup , Encrypt , Decrypt ) denote the key-generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms of the derived public key scheme. The transform also makes use of a one-time signature scheme, defined by a tuple of algorithms (SigGen, Sign, Verify).
The algorithm Setup is defined to be equal to Setup, i.e. public/private key of the PKE scheme is the master public/private keys, (mpk, msk), of the IBE scheme. Algorithm Encrypt is defined as follows: First, a key-pair (sk, vk) for the one-time signature scheme is created by calling SigGen; then the message is encrypted via Encrypt(mpk, vk, m) with respect to the "identity" vk to produce c. The resulting ciphertext c is then signed with sk to produce σ = Sign(sk, c). The tuple (vk, c, σ ) is the ciphertext for our PKE.
To decrypt the recipient first verifies σ is a valid signature on c with respect to the verification key vk, by calling Verify(vk, c, σ ). If it is then the function KeyDer is called with respect to the "identity" vk, using private key of the PKE (i.e. msk). Then the ciphertext can be decrypted using the algorithm Decrypt.
Wildcard Identity-Based Encryption

Syntax
Identity-based encryption with wildcards (WIBE) schemes are essentially a generalisation of HIBE schemes where at the time of encryption, the sender can decide to make the ciphertext decryptable by a whole range of users whose identities match a certain pattern. Such a pattern is described by a vector P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) ∈ ({0, 1} * ∪ {*}) , where * is a special wildcard symbol. We say that identity ID = (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) matches P , denoted ID ∈ * P , if and only if ≤ and for all i = 1, . . . , we have that ID i = P i or P i = *. Note that under this definition, any ancestor of a matching identity is also a matching identity. This is reasonable for our purposes because any ancestor can derive the secret key of a matching descendant identity anyway.
If P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) is a pattern, then we define W (P ) to be the set of wildcard positions in P , i.e.
Formally, a WIBE scheme is a tuple of algorithms (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) providing the following functionality. The Setup and KeyDer algorithms behave exactly as those of a HIBE scheme. To create a ciphertext of a message m ∈ {0, 1} * intended for all identities matching pattern P , the sender computes C $ ← Encrypt(mpk, P , m). Any of the intended recipients ID ∈ * P can decrypt the ciphertext using its own decryption key as m ← Decrypt(d ID , C) .
Note that we implicitly assume that the pattern P used to encrypt the message is included within the ciphertext. This is because any parent of the pattern should be able to decrypt the message, and hence the parent will need to be able to fill in the nonwildcarded entries in the pattern for decryption. For example, suppose the pattern is P = (ID 1 , *, ID 3 ) and that the decryptor has identity ID = (ID 1 , ID 2 ) . Then by our definition of a matching pattern we have ID ∈ * P , and so the decryptor will need to be informed of ID 3 so as to be able to decrypt the ciphertext. Note that an anonymous version of the definitions can be presented, but we do not consider this further in this paper for simplicity.
Correctness requires that for all key pairs (mpk, msk) output by Setup, all messages m ∈ {0, 1} * , all 0 ≤ ≤ L, all patterns P ∈ ({0, 1} * ∪ {*}) , and all identities ID ∈ * P , we have Decrypt KeyDer(msk, ID), Encrypt(mpk, P , m) = m with probability one.
Security Notions
We define the security of WIBE schemes analogously to that of HIBE schemes, but with the adversary choosing a challenge pattern instead of an identity to which the challenge ciphertext will be encrypted. To exclude trivial attacks, the adversary is not able to query the key derivation oracle on any identity that matches the challenge pattern, nor is it able to query the decryption oracle on the challenge ciphertext in combination with any identity matching the challenge pattern.
More formally, the IND-WID-CPA security model is defined through the following game, played between an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger: The adversary wins the game if β = β and it never queries the decryption oracle on any identity ID which matches the pattern P * , i.e. any identity ID ∈ * P * . The adversary's advantage is defined as |2 · Pr [ A wins ] − 1|. A (t, q K , ) -adversary against the IND-WID-CPA security of the WIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most t, makes at most q K key derivation oracle queries, and has advantage at least in the IND-WID-CPA game described above.
In the IND-WID-CCA, the security model is identical to the IND-WID-CPA security model with the exception that the adversary has access to a decryption oracle, which will, on input of an identity ID and a ciphertext C, return Decrypt (KeyDer(msk, ID), C) . The adversary wins the game if β = β , it never queries the decryption oracle on any identity ID ∈ * P * , and the adversary does not query the decryption oracle the combination of any identity ID ∈ * P * and the ciphertext C * . The adversary's advantage is defined as |2 · Pr [ A wins ] − 1|. A (t, q K , q D , ) -adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most t, makes at most q K key derivation oracle queries, makes at most q D decryption oracle queries, and has advantage at least in the IND-WID-CCA game described above.
As for the case of HIBEs, we also define a weaker selective-identity (sWID) security notion, in which the adversary commits to the challenge pattern at the beginning of the game, before the master public key is made available. The notions of IND-sWID-CPA and IND-sWID-CCA security are defined analogously to the above. In the random oracle model, the additional parameter q H denotes the adversary's maximum number of queries to the random oracle, or the total number of queries to all random oracles when it has access to multiple ones.
If the WIBE scheme has a finite message space M, then we may also define a oneway notion for encryption security (OW-WID-CPA). This is formally defined via the following game, played between an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger: The adversary wins the game if m = m and the adversary never queries the key derivation oracle on an identity ID ∈ * P * . The adversary's advantage is defined to be |2 · Pr [ A wins ] − 1|.
Definition 11. A (t, q K , )-adversary against the OW-WID-CPA security of the WIBE scheme is an algorithm that runs in time at most t, makes at most q K key derivation oracle queries, and has advantage at least in winning the OW-WID-CPA game described above.
Constructing a WIBE from a HIBE
In order to clarify the relationship between HIBEs and WIBEs, we first point out a generic construction of a WIBE scheme from any HIBE scheme. However, this WIBE scheme has a secret key size that is exponential in the depth of the hierarchy tree. Let "*" denote a dedicated bitstring that cannot occur as a user identity. Then the secret key of a user with identity (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) in the WIBE scheme contains the 2 HIBE secret keys of all patterns matching this identity. For example, the secret key of identity (ID 1 , ID 2 ) contains four HIBE secret keys, namely those corresponding to identities
To encrypt to a pattern (P 1 , . . . , P ), one uses the HIBE scheme to encrypt to the identity obtained by replacing each wildcard in the pattern with the "*" string, i.e. the identity (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) where ID i = "*" if P i = * and ID i = P i otherwise. The final WIBE ciphertext consists of the pattern and the HIBE ciphertext. Decryption is done by selecting the appropriate secret key from the list and using the decryption algorithm of the HIBE scheme. Notice that the appearance of the term 2 L in the security reduction means that this construction is only guaranteed to be secure when the number of levels grows polylogarithmically in the secure parameter. This restriction occurs in the security analysis of all the HIBE schemes that we consider.
The efficiency of the WIBE scheme obtained with this construction is roughly the same as that of the underlying HIBE scheme, but with the major disadvantage that the size of the secret key is 2 times that of a secret key in the underlying HIBE scheme. This is highly undesirable for many applications, especially since the secret key may very well be kept on an expensive secure storage device. It is interesting to investigate whether WIBE schemes exist with overhead polynomial in all parameters. We answer this question in the affirmative here by presenting direct schemes with secret key size linear in . Unfortunately, for all of our schemes, this reduction in key size comes at the cost of linear-size ciphertexts, while the generic scheme can achieve constant-size ciphertexts when underlain by a HIBE with constant ciphertext size, e.g. that of [10] .
The Relationship Between WIBEs and Generalized Identity-Based Encryption, Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption, and Attribute Based Encryption
As we have seen WIBEs are closely related to HIBEs. They are also related to a concept called Generalised Identity-Based Encryption (GIBE) [9] . In a GIBE one has a set of policies P and a set of roles R. The roles are partially ordered so that a "higher" role can delegate its abilities to a "lower" role. Whether a party can decrypt a ciphertext depends on whether a predicate defined on the set P × R evaluates to true. In particular, a ciphertext is encrypted to a policy π ∈ P , and it can be decrypted by a role ρ if and only if the predicate evaluated on (π, ρ) evaluates to true. It is easy to see that the roles in a GIBE correspond to the identities in a WIBE, whilst the policies correspond to the wildcarded patterns. Hence, a WIBE is a specific example of a GIBE. However, the expressive nature of a GIBE being greater than that of a WIBE comes at a cost, in that one can construct WIBE schemes which are more secure than the equivalent GIBE. Another related primitive is fuzzy identity-based encryption (FIBE) [23] , which allows a ciphertext encrypted to identity ID to be decrypted by any identity ID that is "close" to ID according to some metric. In the schemes of [23] , an identity is a subset containing n elements from a finite universe. Two identities ID and ID are considered "close" if |ID ∩ ID | ≥ d for some parameter d. A FIBE with n = 2L and d = L can be used to construct a WIBE scheme (without hierarchical key derivation) by letting the decryption key for identity (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) correspond to the decryption key for the set
Suppose that "⊥" is a unique string which cannot occur as a user identity and distinct from "*". One can encrypt to pattern P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) by encrypting to the set
where the P i ← P i if i / ∈ W (P ) and P i ← "*" if i ∈ W (P ). The dummy symbols "⊥" are only used to ensure that the size of the encryption set is exactly 2L (as required by the definition of the FIBE scheme). We stress that this construction does not give a full WIBE scheme as it does not permit hierarchical key derivation. This also implies that a "parent" identity cannot decrypt message sent to its "children" identities as it cannot derive the key for the child.
Fuzzy-IBE, GIBEs, and WIBEs are themselves examples of a policy-based encryption mechanisms. In such systems, access to encrypted data is provided as long as the recipient has a key (or set of keys) which correspond to some policy. The power of identity-based mechanisms to enable policy-based access control to encrypted data was realised very early on in the history of pairing-based IBE [26] . In recent years, this idea has been formalised under the heading of Attribute Based Encryption.
In Attribute Based Encryption [23] , or, more correctly, Ciphertext-Policy AttributeBased Encryption (CP-ABE) [4, 17] , a recipient is issued keys corresponding to a number of credentials. An encryptor will encrypt a message under a policy, i.e. a set of credentials which are required by any user who wishes to obtain access to the message. Any recipient which has credential key which meet the policy statement has access to the encrypted data. The defining characteristic of CP-ABE is that the policies are embedded in the ciphertexts.
In the context of WIBEs, the policy is that the user should have a key (credential) which matches the pattern. For a pattern such as (ID 1 , *, ID 3 ) this can be interpreted as having a credential for an identity with ID 1 in the first position and an identity with ID 3 in the third position. However, a CP-ABE scheme would offer separate credentials (keys) for each position, whereas a WIBE compresses all of these credentials in a single key. Hence, ABE is clearly a more powerful concept than a WIBE, as it allows more expressive policies, but WIBE schemes are often simpler to construct.
Identity-Based Key Encapsulation with Wildcards
We can also define a notion of Identity-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism with Wildcards (WIB-KEM). A WIB-KEM consists of the following four algorithms (Setup, KeyDer, Encap, Decap). The algorithms Setup and KeyDer are defined as in the WIBE case. The encapsulation algorithm Encap takes the master public key mpk of the system and a pattern P , and returns (C, K), where K ∈ {0, 1} λ is a symmetric key and C is an encapsulation of the key K. Again we assume that the encapsulation includes a public encoding of the pattern P under which the message has been encrypted. Finally, the decapsulation algorithm Decap(mpk, d ID , C) takes a private key d ID and an encapsulation C, and returns either a secret key K or the error symbol ⊥.
A WIB-KEM must satisfy the following soundness property: for all pairs (mpk, msk) output by Setup, all 0 ≤ ≤ L, all patterns P ∈ ({0, 1} * ∪ { * }) , and all identities ID ∈ * P , we have The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle and decryption oracle as before. The adversary outputs a bit β .
The adversary wins the game if β = β , it never queries the key derivation oracle on any identity ID ∈ * P * , and if it does not query the decryption oracle on the pair (ID, C * ) for some ID ∈ * P * after it receives the challenge ciphertext. As usual, the adversary's advantage is defined to be equal to |2 · Pr [ A wins ] − 1|. Another common form for writing the advantage of an IND-WID-CCA adversary for a WIB-KEM is given by the following simple lemma. A (t, q K , q D , ) -adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of a HIB-KEM is an algorithm that runs in time t, makes at most q K queries to the key derivation oracle, makes at most q D queries to the decryption oracle, and has advantage at least in winning the IND-WID-CCA game described above.
Lemma 1. If A is a (t, q K , q D , )-adversary against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM and β, β are as in the IND-WID-CCA security game, then
= Pr β = 1 | β = 1 − Pr β = 1 | β = 0 .
Definition 12.
We may combine a WIB-KEM (Setup, KeyDer, Encap, Decap) with a DEM (Enc, Dec) (see Sect. 2.9) to form a complete WIBE scheme (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt), where the encryption and decryption algorithms are as follows:
-Encrypt(mpk, P * , m): Proof. This proof mirrors the proofs of Cramer and Shoup [14] and Bentahar et al. [3] . We prove this result in two stages. First, we change the nature of the security game. Let Game 1 be the normal IND-WID-CCA game for the WIBE scheme. Let Game 2 be the slight adaptation of the IND-WID-CCA game: 
Theorem 4. If there exists a (t, q K , q D , )-adversary
The adversary runs A 2 on the input C * and the state information state. The adversary is given access to a key derivation oracle as before. The adversary is also given to a decryption oracle that, on input of an identity ID and a ciphertext
if ID ∈ * P * and
The adversary outputs a bit β .
Note that the only two differences between the game and the IND-WID-CCA game are that a random key is used to compute the challenge ciphertext and to decrypt certain ciphertexts after the challenge ciphertext is issued. We show that any change in the actions of A between Game 1 and Game 2 give rise to an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against the IND-WID-CCA security of the WIB-KEM. We describe the algorithm B 1 below: However, the security of Game 2 depends only on the (one-time) IND-CCA security of the DEM. We give an algorithm B = (B 1 , B 2 ) reduces the security of the WIBE in Game 2 to the security of the DEM. We describe the algorithm B 1 below: swers it correctly using its knowledge of the master private key msk. If A 2 makes a decryption oracle query on an identity ID ∈ * P * and a ciphertext (C * 1 , C 2 ) then B 2 computes the correct answer by querying its own decryption on C 2 and returning the result. Otherwise, if A 2 makes a decryption oracle query on an identity ID and a ciphertext C, then B 2 computes the correct answer using its knowledge of the master private key msk. A 2 outputs a bit β . 3. B 2 outputs the bit β . 
IND-WID-CPA Secure WIBEs
In this section, we propose several WIBE schemes which are IND-WID-CPA secure, based on three existing HIBE schemes from the Boneh-Boyen family (BB-HIBE, BBG-HIBE, Waters-HIBE). These three direct constructions all utilise a similar technique of modifying a HIBE's ciphertext generation to include some extra data related to each wildcard. The security proof then reduces the security of the resulting WIBE to that of the underlying HIBE. These schemes are all proven secure using the same "projection" technique and so we only prove the security of one scheme (Waters-WIBE) relative to the security of the underlying HIBE (in this case Waters-HIBE). Note, in that due to our earlier comment on the lack of a full security proof for the Waters-HIBE, we obtain a full security theorem only for the cases of the BB-and BBG-based WIBE's.
Each of these three schemes is proven secure, relative to the underlying HIBE, in the standard model; however, two of these schemes are only proven secure in the INDsWID-CPA model. We therefore give a generic transformation from an IND-sWID-CPA secure scheme to an IND-WID-CPA secure scheme which uses the random oracle model.
The Boneh-Boyen WIBE
Our first construction is based on the slight variant of the BB-HIBE [7] which we prove secure in Sect. 2.6. As with the BB-HIBE scheme, the BB-WIBE makes use of identities which are vectors of elements of Z p . The scheme is described in Fig. 4 . Note that the decryption algorithm can determine if i ∈ W (P ) by checking whether C 2,i contains one group element or two.
The BB-WIBE can actually be seen as a close relative of the Waters-WIBE scheme (see Sect. 5.3) with the hash function F i (ID i ) being defined as
Its security properties are different though since the BB-WIBE scheme can be proved secure in the selective-identity model only. We reduce its security to that of the BB-HIBE scheme, which in its turn is proved IND-sHID-CPA secure under the BDDH assumption in Sect. 2.6. The proof of the theorem below is analogous to that of Theorem 7, and hence omitted. One important difference with Theorem 7 is that the reduction from the BB-HIBE scheme is tight: because we prove security in the selective-identity model, we do not lose a factor 2 L due to having to guess the challenge pattern upfront.
Theorem 5. If there exists a (t, q K , )-adversary against the IND-sWID-CPA security of a BB-WIBE (with hierarchy depth L) then there exists a (t , q K , )-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BB-HIBE, where
where t exp is the time required to compute an exponentiation in G.
In terms of efficiency, the BB-WIBE scheme easily outperforms the Waters-WIBE scheme: the master public key contains 2L+3 group elements. Encryption to a recipient Algorithm Setup:
Algorithm Encrypt(mpk, P , m):
Algorithm Decrypt (d (ID 1 ,...,ID ) , C) :
Return m pattern of length and w wildcards involves + w + 2 (multi-)exponentiations and produces ciphertexts containing + w + 2 group elements, or 2L + 2 group elements in the worst case that = w = L. Decryption requires the computation of + 1 pairings, just like the Waters-WIBE scheme. However, this scheme is outperformed by the BBG-WIBE.
The Boneh-Boyen-Goh WIBE
Our second construction is based on the BBG-HIBE [10] (see Sect. 2.7). The BBG-HIBE scheme has the advantage of constant-sized ciphertexts. Our BBG-WIBE scheme does not have this advantage, but does have the advantage that a pattern with w wildcards leads to a ciphertext with w + 3 elements and is secure under the same decisional L-BDHI problem as the BBG-HIBE. Again, identities are considered to be vectors of elements of Z p and the scheme is given in Fig. 5 . The BBG-WIBE scheme is significantly more efficient than the Waters-WIBE and BB-WIBE schemes in terms of decryption, and also offers more efficient encryption and shorter ciphertexts when the recipient pattern contains few wildcards. More precisely, the master public key contains L + 4 group elements. Encryption to a recipient pattern of length with w wildcards involves w + 3 (multi-)exponentiations and w + 3 group elements in the ciphertext, or L + 3 of these in the worst case that = w = L. Decryption requires the computation of two pairings, as opposed to + 1 of these for the Waters-WIBE and BB-WIBE schemes.
Again, the proof of the following theorem is analogous to that of Theorem 7, and hence omitted.
Algorithm Setup:
Theorem 6. If there is a (t, q K , )-adversary against the IND-sWID-CPA security of the BBG-WIBE (with hierarchy depth L) then there exists a (t , q K , )-adversary against the IND-sHID-CPA security of the BBG-HIBE where
where t exp is the time it takes to perform an exponentiation in G.
The Waters WIBE
Our third construction is based on the Waters-HIBE [27] (see Sect. 2.8). As in the HIBE scheme, the WIBE makes use of identities which are n-bit strings and a series of hash functions (F 1 , . . . , F L ) where
The scheme is described in Fig. 6 . In terms of efficiency, the Waters-WIBE compares unfavourably with the BB-WIBE and BBG-WIBE (but (conjecturally) provides stronger security guarantees in the standard model). The master public key of the Waters-WIBE scheme contains (n + 1)L + 3 group elements. Encrypting to a pattern of length containing w wildcards comes at the cost of + nw + 2 exponentiations and + nw + 2 group elements in the ciphertext; in the worst case of = w = L this means (n + 1)L + 2 exponentiations and group elements. (The pairingê(h 1 , g 2 ) can be precomputed.) Decryption requires the computation of + 1 pairings.
Return (d 0 , d 1 , . . . , d , d +1 ) Algorithm Encrypt(mpk, P , m):
Return m In terms of efficiency, the Waters-WIBE scheme performs well enough to be considered for use in practice, but definitely leaves room for improvement. The main problem is the dependency of the scheme on n, the bit length of identity strings. In practice, one would typically use the output of a collision-resistant hash function as identity strings, so that n = 160 for a reasonable level of security. We note that the techniques of [12, 22] could be applied to trade a factor d in efficiency against the loss of a factor of 2 Ld in the tightness of the reduction.
We now prove the security of the Waters-WIBE, relative to the security of the Waters-HIBE. This proof provides a template for the proofs of the security theorems for the BB and BBG WIBE's mentioned above. We reduce the security of the Waters-WIBE to the security of the Waters-HIBE. The security of the latter scheme, as has already been mentioned, is believed to reduce to the security of the BDDH problem (see Sect. 2.8).
Theorem 7. If there exists a (t, q K , )-adversary against the IND-WID-CPA security of the Waters-WIBE scheme (with hierarchy depth L) then there exists a (t , q K , )-adversary against the IND-HID-CPA security of the HIBE scheme, where
and t exp is the time it takes to perform an exponentiation in G. A 2 ) against the IND-WID-CPA security of the Waters-WIBE scheme. We construct an adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against the IND-HID-CPA security of the Waters-HIBE.
Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, q K , )-adversary
The intuitive idea behind the proof is that B guesses the levels in which the challenge pattern contains wildcards. Any query that A makes is passed by B to its own oracles after stripping out the levels corresponding to wildcards in the challenge pattern. To this end, we construction a "projection" map π : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L}. Suppose that P * ∈ {ε, *} L is B's guess for the wildcard positions in the challenge pattern. DefineP * ≤i to be equal to the first i components ofP * and define π as
B is an adversary against the Waters-HIBE scheme. We denote parameters associated with the HIBE scheme using tildes. The algorithm B 1 runs as follows:
1. B 1 takes as input the master public key of the HIBE schemem pk = (g 1 ,g 2 ,h 1 ,
3. B 1 computes the master public key mpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h 1 , u 1,0 , . . . , u L,n ) as follows: The challenger will now encrypt m β under the identityĨ D * using the Waters-HIBE (for
. This results in a ciphertextC * = (C * 1 ,C * 2,1 , . . . ,C * 2,˜ * ,C * 3 ) which is input to the algorithm B 2 described below:
as follows: We make several observations about the adversary B. First, note that B cannot correctly guess the bit β unless it correctly guesses the locations of the wildcards in the challenge pattern. This happens with probability at least 1/2 L . Second, we observe that if B correctly guesses the position of the wildcards in the challenge ciphertext, then B correctly simulates the key derivation oracle and challenge ciphertext for A. Furthermore, if B correctly guesses the position of the wildcards in the challenge ciphertext, then any legal key derivation oracle query that A makes results in a legal key derivation oracle query made by B. This is because for any identity ID ∈ * P * there must exist an index i such that P * i = * and Note that the proof above loses a factor of 2 L in the security reduction. This limits the secure use of the scheme in practice to very small (logarithmic) hierarchy depths, but this was already the case for the Waters-HIBE scheme, which loses a factor (nq K ) L in its reduction to the BDDH problem. Alternatively, if we only consider patterns with a single sequence of consecutive wildcards, for example (ID 1 , *, *, *, ID 5 ) or (ID 1 , *, *), then we only lose a factor of L 2 when reducing to the Waters-HIBE scheme. If we consider the selective-identity notion, there is no need to guess the challenge pattern, so we do not lose any tightness with respect to the Waters-HIBE scheme. In addition, the Waters-HIBE scheme would itself also have a tight security reduction to the BDDH problem in the selective-identity notion.
Converting Selective-Identity Security to Full Security
As observed by Boneh and Boyen [7] for the case of IBE schemes and by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [10] for the case of HIBE schemes, any HIBE scheme that is selective-identity (IND-sHID) secure can be transformed into a HIBE scheme that is fully (IND-HID) secure in the random oracle model. The transformation only works for small hierarchy depths though, since the proof loses a factor O(q L H ) in reduction tightness. We show here that the same transformation works for the case of WIBE schemes at a similar cost of a factor O(q L H ) in reduction. Let Π = (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a WIBE scheme with maximum hierarchy depth L. We construct a WIBE scheme Π = (Setup, KeyDer , Encrypt , Decrypt )
where KeyDer , Encrypt , and Decrypt are identical to KeyDer, Encrypt, and Decrypt with the exception that the identity/pattern is input to a hash function before it is input to the relevant algorithm. A pattern P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) is transformed into a pattern P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) where
where 
Proof. Suppose there exists a (t, q K , q H , )-adversary
against Π that uses A as a subroutine. The algorithm B 0 runs as follows: The challenger now issues the master public key mpk to the adversary. Algorithm B 1 run as follows: -Suppose A 1 queries the key derivation oracle on ID = (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) B wins the IND-sWID-CPA game if (1) A wins the IND-WID-CPA game; (2) B does not abort because the challenge pattern it outputs is incorrect; (3) A does not force B to make an illegal key derivation oracle query. The idea is that the counterŝ ctr i are B's guess as to which oracle query will define the challenge patterns (where a counter values ofĉ tr i = 0 means that position is a wildcard). We require that for each of the hash oracles provides no collisions-i.e. for each ID = ID we have H i (ID) = H i (ID ). Since such a collision could only occur by accident, the probability is bounded by (q H + q K L + 1) 2 /|ID| as there exists at most q H + q K L + 1 entries in all the lists. We exclude the possibility this occurs by losing an additive factor of (q H + q K L) 2 /|ID| in the security reduction.
Furthermore, we require that the algorithm B correctly identifies the pattern that A outputs. Since the values are chosen at random, we have thatˆ * = * with probability 1/(L + 1) and that theĉ tr i value will be correct with probability 1/(q H + q K L + 1). If B correctly guesses these values and there are no hash collisions, then A will never force B to make an illegal key derivation query. Hence, the result of the theorem holds.
The above theorem is easily seen to extend to the case of converting an IND-sWID-CCA scheme into an IND-WID-CCA scheme, with an appropriate alteration of the error term in the advantage statement; to take into account the number of decryption oracle queries. Indeed, adversary B is modified so that when it obtains a decryption query it first hashes the identities to produce a decryption query suitable for A. Such a simulation will fail if and only if the hashed identity is equivalent to the challenge identity for A, but this would imply a collision in the random oracle.
IND-WID-CCA Secure WIBEs
In this section, we present constructions for IND-WID-CCA secure WIBEs. We present one generic transform from an IND-WID-CPA WIBE into an IND-WID-CCA WIBE Algorithm Encrypt (mpk, P , m): based on the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [11] and a generic random-oracle-based transform from an OW-WID-CPA WIBE into an IND-WID-CCA WIB-KEM based on a transform of Dent [15] .
The Canetti-Halevi-Katz Transform
In this section, we construct a variant of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform [11] to convert an IND-WID-CPA secure WIBE with hierarchy depth L + 1 into an IND-WID-CCA secure WIBE with hierarchy depth L, using a one-time signature scheme (see Sect. 2.3).
In order to complete this transform, we will make liberal use of an "encoding" function Encode. We will need to restrict the space of allowable identities. We assume that "−" represents some fixed, public-known allowable identity for the CPA scheme; we will deliberately exclude "−" from the space of allowable identities in the CCA scheme. We assume that 1 k is an allowable identity in the CCA scheme. We then encode a pattern P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) and a verification key vk as the L + 1 level identity:
We define a similar map for identities (interpreted as patterns without wildcards).
Given an IND-WID-CPA WIBE scheme Π = (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) with hierarchy depth L + 1, we define an IND-WID-CCA WIBE Π = (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt , Decrypt ) with hierarchy depth L. This scheme is described in Fig. 7 . The encryption algorithm now produces ciphertexts which are (a) encrypted under the pattern Encode(P , vk) for a randomly generated (sk, vk) $ ← SigGen, and (b) signed using sk. The decryption algorithm checks the signature and (if correct) decrypts the ciphertext using a key for an identity which matches Encode(P , vk) (using the valid identity 1 k in place of wildcards). * ) is defined to be "−" and ID cannot be defined to be "−" since it was excluded from the message space); -if |ID| ≤ |P * | then ID ∈ * Encode(P * , vk * ) as Encode(P * , vk * ) i = P * i for levels 1 ≤ i ≤ |ID| and ID ∈ * P * .
Hence, A never forces B to make an illegal key derivation oracle query and so B wins whenever A. Thus,
A combination of the two claims gives the theorem.
Applying the Transformation to Waters-WIBE We may optimise the CHK transform in the particular case of the Wates-WIBE scheme describe in Sect. 5.3. In particular, there is no implicit functional reason why we have to fix the encoded identity using "−" strings, as it is possible to determine a key for which the (L + 1)th level is fixed to vk while leaving lower levels undetermined. In particular, we obtain the scheme given in Fig. 8 which is IND-CCA secure and has depth L. We assume (for simplicity) that verification keys vk are n-bits long.
The Dent KEM Transform
One approaching to building systems secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks is to transform a weakly-secure (OW-WID-CPA) WIBE scheme into a strongly-secure (IND-WID-CCA) WIB-KEM scheme. This obviously gives rise to an IND-WID-CCA WIBE scheme when combined with a suitably secure DEM (see Sects. 2.9 and 4). We apply an analogue of the transformation of Dent [15] .
Suppose Π = (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) be an OW-WID-CPA WIBE scheme (see Sect. 3.2) with a finite message space M. We assume that the Encrypt algorithm uses random values taken from a set R. We can write Encrypt as a deterministic algorithm C ← Encrypt(mpk, P , m; r) where r $ ← R. We require that the scheme satisfies a notion of randomness called γ -uniformity.
Definition 13.
A WIBE scheme Π is γ -uniform if for all master public keys mpk that could be output by the key generation algorithm, for all patterns P , for all messages m and ciphertexts C, we have Pr Encrypt(mpk, P , m; r) = C ≤ γ, where the probability is taken over the choice of the randomness r used in the encryption function.
The only difficulty in applying the method of Dent [15] is that we must re-encrypt the recovered message as an integrity check. In the WIBE setting, this means we must know the pattern under which the message was originally encrypted. Recall that the set W (C) = {i ∈ Z : P i = *} of the pattern P used to encrypt the message, along with the length of the pattern, is easily derived from the ciphertext. We use this information to give an algorithm P, which on input (ID, C), where C is a ciphertext and ID = (ID 1 , . . . , ID ) , returns the pattern P = (P 1 , . . . , P ) where
Algorithm Setup: Return m We transform the WIBE scheme Π = (Setup, KeyDer, Encrypt, Decrypt) with a finite message space M and hierarchy depth L into a WIB-KEM scheme Π = (Setup, KeyDer, Encap, Decap) using two hash functions: The complete scheme is given in Fig. 9 . The basic strategy of this security proof is to take advantage of the fact that the only way that A can determine if C * is an encapsulation of K * is to query the H 2 -oracle on m * . However, we first have to show that the simulated hash function, key derivation, and decryption oracles are consistent with the real IND-WID-CCA game. The simulated key derivation oracle is perfect, as is the hash function oracle, with the exception that the hash function oracle fails to respond to correctly to an H 1 -oracle query on (P * , m * ) or a H 2 -oracle query on m * . However, the decryption oracle is more problematic. There are two types of error event that can occur with the decryption oracle: -The decryption oracle will respond incorrectly if A 1 queries the oracle on an identity ID ∈ * P * and the ciphertext C * . However, since m * is information theoretically hidden from A 1 , this occurs with probability at most 1/|M|. where T 1 [P , m] is randomly chosen at the end of the game if it is not defined later by an adversarial query. Since T 1 [P , m] is randomly chosen and Π is γ -uniform, we have that this occurs with probability γ .
We have that the probability that either of these events occurs is therefore bounded by q D (|M| −1 + γ ). 
